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INTRODUCTION
The United States military's intense frustration with the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan has served to reinforce the recognition that the IED is a weapon with diverse tactical applications capable of achieving strategic effects. The world has witnessed how IEDs, when employed effectively, are capable of challenging technical superiority, tactical dominance, national objectives, and American will. An IED is cheap, often constructed with readily available commercial materials, and its lethality is limited only by the imagination of the creator. Despite a $58 billion investment in technology, intense focus from the military, industry, academia, and the creation of joint and service specific Counter-IED (C-IED) headquarters, the IED remains the largest casualty producing weapon in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 1 The IED has been responsible for over 3,200 American deaths and 33,000 American injuries in both Iraq and Afghanistan and is predicted by the Department of Defense (DOD) to be a principle weapon in any future conflict. Counter-IED Fusion Cell, sufficiently manned and singularly responsible for the integration and synchronization of all Counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives, will significantly improve targeting activities within the BCT and enable a more offensive posture when confronted with active IED threats. This improvement will increase battlefield survivability for American soldiers and enhance a BCT's ability to accomplish assigned tasks. BCTs will face IEDs in future conflicts and the IED environment has proven to be too complex and too lethal not to have a dedicated staff element assigned primary responsibility for integrating C-IED information and synchronizing C-IED activities. C-IED Fusion Cells are a proven solution and a recognized necessity in high intensity IED environments and need to be a resident capability within each Army BCT.
Request (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013) In the 2013 Budget the Department of Defense requested 1.7 Billion dollars be allocated as a specific line item towards IED defeat.
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The support for this assertion is provided through the following three part analysis. First, an overview of American involvement with the IED during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide an historical baseline and demonstrate how C-IED operations have evolved. This overview demonstrates that the DOD was relatively unprepared for the tactical and strategic significance of the IED in these two conflicts. This placed American forces at a distinct disadvantage and required a significant and unanticipated expenditure of resources to overcome.
Second, the U.S. Military can expect continued exposure to the IED in future conflicts.
Global proliferation of IED technology and expertise is evident through the exponential increase in IED attacks around the world. Lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world, have highlighted the affinity criminals, terrorists, guerillas, and insurgents place on the IED. Despite twelve years of exposure, many BCTs continue to be challenged with how to best organize and operate within high threat IED environments. Examination of several organizational techniques used by BCTs in their battle to defeat IED networks, and the associated difficulties, highlight the challenges many BCTs experience.
Part three of this monograph focuses on how Fusion Cells have been employed in a similar capacity as a means of integrating information, synchronizing activities, and solving complex problems. These case studies are provided to confirm the legitimacy of the Fusion Cell concept. Additionally, recent recognition of the need for C-IED Fusion Cells within DOD doctrinal publications, highlights the merit of this recommendation. Lastly, considerations associated with the composition and disposition of a BCT C-IED Fusion Cell as well as details specific to implementation are provided for use by those considering execution of this recommendation.
Although great progress is being made, the U.S. military cannot afford to risk being unprepared for the IED threat in future conflicts. Military leadership should continue their efforts to actively seek opportunities to improve the BCTs ability to operate in high intensity IED Fighting Vehicle, were virtually indestructible, and when employed correctly, their occupants were relatively secure from the majority of hazards associated with ground combat. A year later, in 2004, the DOD was becoming rapidly aware of the depressing reality that for less than a hundred U.S. dollars, the cutting edge technology and devastating firepower of the M1 and the M2, their associated crews, and other soldiers on most vehicular platforms were vulnerable to the effects of an IED.
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The significance of the IED threat in Iraq becomes readily apparent through the analysis of IED incidents. In September of 2003, approximately six months after the initiation of combat operations, IED attacks in Iraq were averaging 100 per month.
14 Roughly one year after the 12 Smith, 9. 33 Smith, 22. The MEOCC was an existing engineer centric organization that deployed with the corps staff in order to track explosive hazards as a normal part of combat operations. To date the DOD has invested over $58 billion developing, acquiring, and fielding organizational, equipment, and training solutions designed to address the lethal nature of the IED environment and better position U.S. forces to prevent, detect, and survive IED detonations.
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Since its inception, JIEDDO itself has fielded over 63 separate initiatives designed to improve the war-fighter's ability to attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force. 37 Despite these investments, the IED continues to be a persistent battlefield threat, and is predicted to remain so in future conflicts.
THE IED IN FUTURE CONFLICTS
Despite the efforts listed above to reduce effectiveness and prevent proliferation, IED attacks on other battlefields has also increased significantly. From January 2011 to November 2011, not including events in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were over 6,800 IED attacks around the world. These attacks caused over 12,000 casualties, in 111 different countries, and were executed 34 Smith, 22, 23. Facing the prospect of defeat against a numerically, militarily, or industrially superior opponent, the use of IEDs by relatively inferior forces should come as no surprise. From the perspective of the outnumbered, outgunned, and ill-equipped, the decision to employ IEDs is logical because they are cheap, flexible, and highly effective weapons. They provide a pragmatic guerrilla, insurgent or terrorist, or so called freedom fighter with a weapon capable of striking a punishing blow against their enemy's combat advantage. 42 Adversaries of the United States will continue to use IEDs in future conflicts because they are an efficient means of accomplishing political, tactical, and strategic objectives. A 2013 White House policy memo on Countering Improvised Explosive Devices states that the IED remains the most effective and available weapon to the terrorist or criminal seeking to damage infrastructure and inflict casualties. The memo also predicts that IED tactics and the sophistication associated with IED attacks will continue to evolve as adversaries seek to overcome IED countermeasures. 43 America's involvement in Iraq has demonstrated to the world that the IED can allow the unseen enemy to deliver devastating destruction and inflict significant casualties against better trained, better equipped, and technologically advanced military. The IED allows the enemy to pick the times and place of their choosing, provides a significant propaganda tool, and can effect changes of strategy and policy of nation states. 44 As such, the IED is the perfect weapon for the insurgent, terrorist, and guerrilla. To further appreciate the role of the IED in future conflicts and the affinity of the IED by terrorists, guerillas, and insurgents, it important to understand how the IED supports the accomplishment of their objectives.
Insurgent, Terrorist, and Guerrilla
The terms Insurgent, Terrorist, and Guerrilla each have distinct meanings worthy of discussion. The U.S. Military defines an insurgency an "organizational movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
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Terrorism on the other hand, is defined by many analysts as "the threat or use of physical coercion against non-combatants to create fear in order to achieve political objectives." "Guerrilla 46 Benjamin A. Bennett, "Development of a Methodology for Evaluating and Anticipating Improvised Explosive Device Threat Activity Using a Fault Tree Based Process" (Doctoral achieve specific objectives. For purpose of this discussion all three terms are collectively described as insurgents.
Insurgents use violence in a calculated way intended to achieve specific results. Insurgent violence is not random; it is used deliberately to achieve specific short and long term results.
47 To achieve their goals insurgents effectively distinguish between two separate sets of targets. These two distinct target sets include: the "target of attack" and "target of influence." The "target of attack" is physical entity being destroyed or damaged by the IED. The "target of attack" is used to direct a broader message to the target of influence. Successful manipulation of both target sets ultimately leads to a behavior change. This behavior change is the ultimate objective of the insurgent.
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The IED is ideally suited for integration into this approach. The IED is effective because it allows the insurgent not only do physical damage but also capitalize on the psychological and informational aspect of warfare. The IED enables the insurgent to demonstrate power and capability while simultaneously sending a message to the state and the populace. It enhances the perception that the military and the state control neither the terrain nor the population. 49 The IED allows the insurgent to frustrate the military force while simultaneously, through the use of media, contributing to the erosion of political support for the conflict and the population's expectation for conflict termination.
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An IED strikes unexpectedly like the piercing crack of a sniper rifle. Martin, 7, 36. news coverage. Images of IED attacks invoke strategic influence over the public, a public otherwise physically dislocated from combat….The strategic power of the IED comes from a non-kinetic source, information.
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The current Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno states that the Army must be prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions against complex opponents in diverse terrain. The missions include counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, counter weapons of mass destruction, as well as defense of the homeland and support to civil authorities. 52 The IED has been repeatedly used in all of these environments. If history serves as an example, it is reasonable to expect that these mission sets will involve aggressive use of, and repeated exposure to the IED threat.
The Army must continue to search for ways to increase its preparedness for the IED Intelligence and Operations sections, and it is logical to believe that the existing structure is sufficient to address the IED threat. Other BCTs believe that because a BSTB is the organic headquarters of the Route Clearance Company, administratively responsible for allocated EOD assets, then C-IED operations is a natural mission for the BSTB headquarters. In most cases however, these three techniques fail to maximize the intelligence integration and asset synchronization which can be achieved by an independent entity, with a singular focus on the complexity of the IED environment. The common deficiencies of each general approach are provided under the general description of the Staff Centric Approach, the BSTB Centric Approach, and the Targeting Approach.
The Staff Centric Approach
The BCT Intelligence Section (S-2) is responsible for integrating an enormous amount of information concerning a multitude of threats from numerous sources and agencies operating throughout the environment. This intelligence comes from diverse sources, provided from multiple platforms, focused on entities engaging in a multitude of nefarious activities. In itself, this is a daunting and all consuming task. The complexities associated with the IED environment make thorough identification, analysis, and dissemination of all available IED specific data even more cumbersome and serve to highlight why a dedicated element is recommended. JIEDDO's organization responsible for fusing and integrating C-IED intelligence and operations, namely the 
This does not include other related activities such as Engineer Route Clearance Patrols (RCP) and
Presence Patrols which, when synchronized with a detailed C-IED ISR plan can achieve synergistic effects. 59 Positioning the right asset, at the right time, and at the correct location, to detect and exploit, specific IED network activity, requires technical expertise, comprehensive analysis, and dedicated attention to detailed aspects of the IED environment. Most BCT S-2 sections are not sufficiently manned with the requisite expertise to perform this level of dedicated and focused analysis against a single aspect of the environment.
Another common trend is to assign primary responsibility to the BCT Operations Officer (BCT S-3) who often delegates responsibility to the BCT Engineer. For reasons similar to that of the BCT S-2 approach, this approach often fails to achieve a complete synthesis of information and synchronization of assets. Much like the BCT S-2 section, the BCT S-3 and BCT Engineer's section in particular, are not staffed with sufficient personnel, or with the right collective expertise, to conduct a holistic analysis of the C-IED environment. When deployed, the BCT Engineer quickly becomes consumed responsibilities specific to general engineering activities, which generally involves extensive external coordination. 60 When this occurs, the BCT Engineer usually further delegates responsibility for synchronizing C-IED activities to the junior officer assigned to the BCT Engineer section who has usually had recent firsthand experience with C-IED operations, often having already served a platoon leader. When this occurs, the BCT Engineer's role, and by default the BCT S-3's role in synchronizing the C-IED fight becomes relegated to publishing the RCP schedules and ensuring that RCP assets are available to support specific battalion level operations. Consequently, this approach to synchronization fails to adequately integrate the multitude of threat specific ISR assets, enemy TTPs, and the previously mentioned synergistic effect. This, understandably, is an unintended consequence of not having sufficient personnel, with the right collection of expertise, dedicated to a single aspect of the environment and perpetuates a reactive approach to C-IED operations. When this occurs, BCTs are denied the opportunity to achieve the offensive momentum achievable through a dedicated approach to IED analysis and synchronization. 
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effects take time to achieve, it is not sufficiently responsive for synchronizing C-IED activities.
The multi-week approach carries the risk that a BCT may focus on solutions to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures that have already evolved and are no longer relevant. The BCT thereby remains reactive to the IED threat.
The IED environments experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ones the U.S.
military should anticipate in future conflicts, are dynamic. 64 Every single day, threat tactics evolve, relevant intelligence is collected, and BCT personnel conduct operations in close proximity to the threat. In order to maximize effectiveness a BCT requires responsive processes for analyzing and disseminating intelligence and synchronizing activities. The tempo of the IED environment is rapid with the enemy quickly adapting to and capitalizing on recognized vulnerabilities. To remain offensive BCTs must be able to rapidly adjust their C-IED posture.
This responsiveness is difficult to achieve when BCTs rely on C-IED and synchronization working groups based on a multi-week targeting process as their primary collaboration venue.
C-IED FUSION CELLS
The The efficiency with which General McChrystal's formation was able to capitalize on the advantages of Fusion Cell activities is apparent in the metric of raids conducted per night. In the early phases of OIF Special Operations forces would conduct one or two raids per night. When operating at full capacity and peak efficiency, General McChrystal's formation could execute multiple raids per night, simultaneously capturing as many as 10-20 "High Value Targets" in a single evening. 73 The speed and precision associated with these operations was supported by the headquarters' ability to rapidly identify timely, accurate, and reliable intelligence, synthesize its relevance, and disseminate it across the formation so it could be actioned before the utility of the information had expired. 74 This fusion of information and synchronization of activities was enabled through the creation of a Fusion Cell.
There are many different units, personnel, and pieces of equipment assigned to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. There is one unique organization designed to bring them all together in order to defeat and drive out the al Qaida presence in Iraq-that organization is known as the Fusion Cell. Set up to bring intelligence and operational resources together in one room in order to carry out timely and accurate terrorist interdiction in Iraq, the Fusion Cell is a revolutionary way of fighting a modern day 71 Peter Goodspeed, "U.S. 'black ops' Key to Revamped Afghan Strategy," National Post Organizations called fusion cells built in Iraq and later in Afghanistan should be a focal point for integrating intelligence and information in the future. An environment where the volume and velocity of information from so many different sources forced organizations such as the brigade combat teams and below to collect and analyze data. This makes the development of these fusion cells a critical requirement. Fusion is about focusing our intelligence and information collections systems, and about the speed of responding to the task, precision in addressing the problem and with the best available capability, and understanding what the expected outcomes should be. This element must be able to communicate rapidly up, down, and laterally across organizations without restrictions (flattening networks). cross-functional collaboration is through the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells…and other enduring and temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish specific tasks." 84 As described in doctrine, and discussed previously, the DOD has addressed this requirement at the theater and division level through the creation and employment of specific C-IED Task Forces. Theater and division level C-IED Task Forces such as CJTF Troy and CJTF Paladin (employed in OIF and OEF respectively) are singularly focused specialty organizations created to assist in the execution of the C-IED fight. These elements assist theater and division headquarters with the integration of tactical and operational level C-IED information and activities. 85 An additional capability also formally recognized in doctrine and one specifically designed to focus on the mitigation of explosive threats, is the Explosive Hazard Coordination Cell (EHCC). Used extensively in OIF, this theater level staff augmentation cell assists theater level headquarters with collection, analysis, and dissemination of explosive hazard information.
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The EHCC provides capability by assisting in the development of operational understanding of explosive threat and assists in the tracking, predication, and distribution of explosive hazard related information. It provides technical and tactical training through the use of training teams and manage the acquisition, distribution, and effectiveness of specialized route clearance assets. 84 Department of Defense, Commander's Handbook for Attack the Network, 1.0, 20 May 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/ann_hbk.pdf (accessed 28 July 2013), ii, v-1. 85 Clark, 2,7.
Although initially designed to address conventional mine threats and explosive remnants of conflict, in OIF they were employed in a C-IED capacity. Special attention must also be given to determining the correct command support relationship between the C-IED Fusion Cell and other elements within the BCT. Creating an independent cell, with an independent charter, not nested under an existing staff section, will enhance organizational responsiveness, increase accountability, and contribute to the cross collaboration vital to successful C-IED operations. An independent section with specific responsibilities, reporting directly to the BCT Chief of Staff, will provide the C-IED Fusion Cell the flexibility to focus on the most critical aspects of the IED environment. This approach will contribute to a more holistic analysis of the environment, complete dissemination of information, and thorough synchronization of activities.
It is recognized that issues relating to the addition of personnel within any Army organization are extremely complex and the implementation of any change to a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) is extremely arduous. 90 It is also understood that the Army operates under a congressionally mandated end-strength and that additions of personnel in one organization must equate to a loss of personnel in other formations. 91 Stated another way, the addition of capability in one formation must equate to a loss of capability in another formation; when personnel movements are complete no increase in overall in end-strength is authorized.
Therefore, the consequences of any decision specific to the addition of personnel must be evaluated holistically, with careful consideration paid to risk of the entire force. Generally speaking, there are two approaches which can be used to implement the concepts described herein. These approaches are described below under the context of a permanent approach and temporary approach.
Establishing a fully manned and capable C-IED Fusion Cell within every BCT in a permanent capacity, is the preferred approach to implementation. Establishing BCT C-IED Fusion Cells as an authorized and required capability, on a permanent basis, will allow the C-IED Fusion Cell the opportunity to refine systems, develop TTPs, identify strengths and weakness, adjust to personalities within the BCT, and to develop subject matter expertise within the IED threat domain. The permanency of this addition will reduce risk as elements within the BCT will be accustomed to integrating with an element of the headquarters responsible for mitigating the most lethal aspect of the operating environment. Furthermore, as the time and resources required to form, train, and integrate a C-IED Fusion Cell prior to deployment will be reduced, overall readiness of the BCT will be increased.
Implementation of this recommendation would only require the reallocation of a few companies worth of personnel. For purposes of discussion, manning each of the planned 32 BCTs in the Army with a ten personnel C-IED Fusion Cell would require the re-distribution of 320
personnel. The re-allocation of 320 positions, identified as excess capacity, within a 490,000
soldier active force equates to a minute overall percentage of the force affected. 92 This equates to approximately two companies worth of personnel being re-invested and a net growth of only ten personnel to an existing 4,500 soldier BCT. 93 The potential return on this investment will be measured in IED discovered, insurgents and networks neutralized, and an overall reduction in American casualties.
If it is determined that establishing a permanent C-IED Fusion Cell within each BCT is not feasible, a second albeit less optimal solution, is to create temporary C-IED Fusion Cells within each BCT. This can be accomplished through implementation of a "required" but "not authorized" structuring of the TOE. 94 In this capacity, the C-IED Fusion Cell would be a formally recognized as a requirement within the BCT headquarters, with place holders for specific personnel, which would only be filled when a BCT receives deployment orders. Although this solution would deny the BCT the opportunity to train together on a repetitive basis and refine processes and systems, it would ensure that the BCT have the capability when most needed. The Implementation of C-IED Fusion Cells within each BCT requires the redistributing a few hundred positions identified as redundant capacity from within the army. Permanently reallocating this capacity to each BCT will impact a minor overall percentage of the active force and equates to a minimum addition of total personnel within each BCT. However, this addition of capability will significantly increase the BCT's ability to mitigate IED threats.
It is recommended that those organizations within the Army responsible for implementing such changes determine the precise number of personnel and most advantageous combination of experience, expertise, and seniority required for the C-IED Fusion Cell. This analysis should focus on the requirement to perform the functions associated with the complete top, down, and horizontal, analysis and integration of C-IED intelligence and thorough synchronization of C-IED assets and activities. Once the composition and disposition of the C-IED Fusion Cell is complete, a feasibility analysis is required to determine which approach to providing this capability most effectively balances risk to the entire Army. Determining whether the permanent addition of this capability or the temporary "required" but "not authorized" approach to implementation most effectively considers and best apportions risk across the entire force is of considerable importance. Once these determinations have been made conditions will be set for full implementation of the recommendations provided herein.
The complexity of the IED environment will increase in the future. Tactics used in IED attacks will continue to evolve as adversaries seek to overcome U.S. technological advancements.
The U.S. Army cannot afford to risk being unprepared for the IED threat in future conflicts.
Continued investments in cognitive capability within war fighting formations, singularly focused on the holistic defeat of the IED, will greatly enhance a unit's ability to leverage scientific advancements and remain offensive rather than reactive, when operating in the IED threat domain. The Army must continue as directed to actively seek opportunities to improve methods, materials, organizations, and procedures, designed to help prevent and mitigate IED attacks.
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The addition of a C-IED Fusion Cell within each BCT provides this opportunity. 96 The White House. Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013).
